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A recent review of US energy research and development identi ed a persistent under-investment in building, industrial and vehicle end-use e ciency compared with investment in a clean electricity supply 1 . is emphasis on innovation of energy-supply technologies is not peculiar to the US. e EU and the major developing countries, as well as the US, allocate around two thirds of public R&D budgets to energy-supply technologies [1] [2] [3] . Directed innovation e orts for climate change mitigation are not limited to public R&D investments. ey involve broader processes of knowledge generation and exchange; are guided by strategic plans, technology roadmaps, and research collaborations; are dependent on leveraged private sector resources; and they are reinforced by experiences with technologies once commercialized. Directed innovation e orts thus permeate the entire system of innovation for energy technologies.
e aim of this Perspective is to assess the balance between energy supply and end-use technologies for directed innovation e orts in response to the challenge of climate change mitigation. First, we develop an analytical framework that integrates the key elements of the innovation system. Second, we apply this analytical framework to energy technologies using a broad set of indicators that characterize a diverse range of innovation processes. In particular, we assess whether inputs into the innovation system are aligned with observed outputs. We also consider required innovation outcomes in an emissions-constrained world, drawing on large-scale modelling studies that nd e cient end-use technologies may contribute the majority of cumulative emission reductions to 2100 4 . ird, we o er a viewpoint on the reasons for our central empirical nding: energy end-use technologies are pervasively marginalized in directed innovation e orts.
e distinction between energy-supply and end-use technologies is widely used in energy systems analysis, management and policy 5 . Energy-supply technologies are used to extract, process, transport and convert energy resources into a form useful to endusers. e emphasis of innovation e orts for reducing emissions from the energy supply is to develop and deploy low or zero carbon-supply options [6] [7] [8] . End-use technologies are used to convert energy into a useful nal service like heating, mobility or communication. e emphasis of innovation e orts for reducing emissions , and concluded that a systemic perspective on innovation was necessary to account for the complex interdependencies between di erent innovation stages, processes and drivers (Fig. 1 ).
e review also found that innovation analyses and policies are o en partial, focusing only on selected elements of the innovation system. For analyses, this can mean biased or decontextualized ndings, and for policies guiding broader innovation e orts, partiality can lead to unintended or adverse consequences.
e early years of the wind-power industry in the 1970s and 80s is a useful case in point. In countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany, public R&D programmes pushed for step-change advances in large-scale, high-e ciency turbines 12, 13 , but limited attention was paid to stimulating market demand, and the energy utilities proved reluctant adopters of these unproven innovations 14 . In Denmark, by comparison, R&D programmes emphasized smaller-scale reliable turbines whose commercial adoption was supported by investment and production subsidies. Developers and landowners became actively engaged in the process of commercial deployment alongside the manufacturers 15 . Institutions like the national testing and certi cation station at Risø provided a means of exchanging knowledge and user experiences within the innovation system 16 . Denmark's systemic approach to wind-power innovation led to its world-leading position in manufacturing and market growth. e selective and partial focus of its early rivals on pushing novel technologies from R&D labs into the market failed to integrate potential adopters and failed to direct broader processes of knowledge generation and exchange. In the Global Energy Assessment
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, many other cases of innovation success are covered, such as the Brazilian ethanol and ex-fuel car industry 17 , as are cases of innovation failure, such as the US 'synfuels' programme to develop liquid or gaseous substitutes for petroleum 18 . In each case, the successes are distinguished by the systemic characteristic of directed innovation e orts.
To assess directed innovation e orts for climate change mitigation, we developed an analytical framework integrating key elements of the innovation system as applied to energy technologies ( Fig. 1) . At the centre of this analytical framework are the stages of innovation during a technology's lifecycle from R&D, through demonstration projects and niche markets, to di usion and ultimate phase-out. Innovation processes link these stages. Once considered unidirectional, with innovation driven strongly by basic research 19 , these innovation processes are now understood to include feedbacks as well as ows 20, 21 . As an example, knowledge generated through R&D activities ows through into the design of commercial prototypes, which are tested in niche markets protected from full commercial pressures 22 . e experiences of technology users then feed back into the iterative process of technology development and improvement.
e innovation lifecycle is driven by forces of both supply and demand. 'Technology-push' drivers reduce the costs of innovation through, for example, education and research; 'market-pull' drivers increase the pay-o s from innovation, for example, by improving the relative advantage of new technologies in the market place 23 . e stages and drivers of the innovation lifecycle for a particular technology play out within a broader innovation system.
Of the elements shown in Fig. 1 , knowledge is the most fundamental 24 , and includes processes of generation and learning 25 . ese, in turn, involve many actors and institutions. Actors are diverse, from entrepreneurs and established rms to research organizations, governments and end-users. Innovation is thus a collective activity, supported by many institutions. e institutions emphasized in our analytical framework are twofold: the propensity of entrepreneurs to invest in risky innovation activities with uncertain pay-o s; and shared expectations around an innovation's future trajectory [26] [27] [28] . Other important and related institutions include law, markets and public policy. Public resources are invested directly into speci c innovation stages, or are used to leverage private sector resources through regulatory or market incentives structured by public policy 29, 30 . Knowledge, actors and institutions, and resources encapsulate the key elements of the innovation system (see Fig. 1 ). ese elements emphasize necessary inputs into the innovation system to ensure its successful functioning. e ultimate measure of success for a particular technology is its widespread adoption and use.
is output of the innovation system is also the means towards broader outcomes of interest such as climate change mitigation. New technologies successfully di use as a function of their relative advantage over incumbent technologies 31 . For energy technologies, this can be measured by the di erence in cost and performance of energy service provision in terms of quality, versatility, environmental impact and so on 32 . Many of these attributes of relative advantage can be shaped by public policy as well as the other elements of the innovation system.
Innovation systems research has typically paid less attention to the di usion and use of technology 33 . Yet the needs and preferences of technology adopters distinguish innovation successes from failures 34 . Technology adoption and use are also strongly interdependent with the knowledge, actors and institutions, and resources of the innovation system 27, 30 .
Indicators of directed innovation e orts
To assess directed innovation e orts in response to climate change mitigation needs, we compiled a set of indicators describing all the key elements of our analytical framework for the innovation system. e di erent stages, processes and drivers of innovation represented in Fig. 1 thus provide the sample space for our indicators. Table 1 shows how our categories of indicators map onto these elements. For the indicators in each of these categories, we contrast the proportion of e ort directed at energy-supply and energy end-use technologies.
Inputs to the innovation system
To characterize inputs to the innovation system, we use indicators of: analysis and modelling; technology roadmaps, collaborations, portfolios and programmes; public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) investments; and niche market investments (Table 2 ). e correspondence between these indicators and our analytical framework is shown in Table 1 .
Analysis and modelling are knowledge-generation activities that underpin our evolving understanding of the potential contribution of technological change to mitigating climate change (see indicators I1.1-1.6 in Table 2 ). Technology roadmaps (I2.1-2.4), collaborative research ventures (I3.1-3.4), and technology portfolios, programmes and training (I4.1-4.4) are all in uential public institutions that frame and direct innovation e orts. ey also help build shared expectations and support entrepreneurial risk-taking "by crystallising the vision of all stakeholders around the common objectives constituted by the roadmaps" . Public resource inputs to the innovation system change over the innovation lifecycle from directly investing in research and development activities (I5.1-5.8) to structuring incentives in speci c market niches to attract private capital. We capture the leveraging of private resources by these directed e orts through additional indicators of niche market investments (I6.1-6.3).
Almost without exception, the indicators of innovation system inputs in Table 2 are strongly weighted towards energy-supply technologies (see column 'End-use as % of total'). is nding is most robust for the public RD&D investment indicators that we consider to o er good coverage both spatially and in terms of sample space (see Methods for details). Figure 2 extends the indicators I5-I6 by summarizing available data on direct public expenditures as well as the leveraging e ect of public policy and expenditures on private investments in niche markets. Energy-supply technologies are disaggregated to distinguish resource extraction from conversion (for example, electricity generation), and renewable from fossil-fuel technologies. This stylistic representation of the innovation system includes the following key elements: innovation stages (grey doubleheaded arrows, illustrating the importance of feedbacks between stages); innovation drivers (green rhombi and block arrows); and innovation processes (blue and brown frame). Drivers and processes more characteristic of innovation inputs (blue frame) are distinguished from those more characteristic of innovation outputs (brown frame). Innovation outcomes are also shown (orange arrow).
Although Fig. 2 is a partial snapshot of directed innovation expenditure, it usefully illustrates two further points. First, the magnitude of subsidy for fossil-fuel consumption, estimated to approach $500 billion 35 , dwarfs innovation investments of some $160 billion in a post-fossil-fuel energy supply. Second, renewable electricity supply (predominantly wind and solar PV) and 'smart' grid technologies dominate public support in the early RD&D and niche market stages of the innovation lifecycle. Directed innovation e orts are therefore 'pushing' energy-supply technologies to mitigate climate change into a market occupied by heavily subsidized incumbents. E cient end-use technologies are marginalized throughout. Table 2 and Fig. 2 illustrate the pervasiveness of privilege accorded to energy-supply technologies in directed innovation e orts. An innovation system with knowledge, institutional and resource inputs heavily weighted towards energy-supply technologies might be expected to produce similarly weighted outputs. To characterize outputs of the innovation system, we use indicators of market di usion, learning and social returns on investment. We include a fourth set of indicators for the broader outcome of interest: mitigation potentials of energy technologies across a range of climate stabilization scenarios. Table 3 summarizes the indicators. e correspondence between these indicators and our analytical framework is shown in Table 1 . Widespread commercial application of energy technologies contributes directly to mitigation. End-use technologies dominate market di usion in terms of both capital invested in the energy system (see indicators O1.1-1.3 in Table 3 ) and energy conversion capacity (O1.4-1.5).
Outputs & outcomes of the innovation system
Di usion is driven by improving performance and decreasing costs associated with learning processes (O2.1-2.2). e e ects of learning are o en measured by the percentage unit cost reduction per successive doubling of cumulative capacity or production as a proxy for experience 36, 37 . Mean learning rates in a sample of mass-produced energy end-use technologies such as refrigerators or automobiles are twice as high as for large-scale energy-supply technologies such as nuclear reactors or gas turbines. Moreover, learning rates for largescale energy-supply technologies reported in the literature confound learning e ects with scale economies, which also reduce unit costs as technologies mature and increase in size. Actual learning rates for energy-supply technologies are therefore likely to be over-estimated.
Learning rates describe technology-speci c consequences of innovation system processes. Social returns on investment capture broader economic, environmental and energy security bene ts, among others. Estimating social returns is methodologically complex 38 and so is o en not attempted 39 . Two landmark studies in the US did, however, estimate the social bene ts of federal energy RD&D expenditure 40, 41 . e ratio of all realized bene ts to total programme costs from 1978-2000 was 83:1 for e cient end-use technologies compared with 7:1 for fossil-fuel energy-supply technologies (see indicators O3.1-3.2 in Table 3) 40 . Not only did end-use e ciency programmes dominate the top rankings of bene t:cost ratios (O3.3), they were also the least costly in the event of unsuccessful commercialization 42 . A subsequent study estimated the expected future bene t:cost ratios for ongoing technology programmes at 10:1 for end-use e ciency and 4:1 for fossil-fuel energy supply 41 . Under assumptions of future carbon pricing, the bene t:cost ratio for e cient end-use technologies improved further to 12:1 (O3.4-3.5).
Almost without exception, the indicators of innovation system outputs in Table 3 are strongly weighted towards end-use technologies (see column 'End-use as % of total'). is nding is most robust for the learning and social returns categories, which we consider to o er good coverage of the sample space. Table 3 also includes indicators of future mitigation potentials based on scenario analyses (O4.1-4.3). e respective contribution of any technology to climate change mitigation is inherently uncertain. Salient uncertainties include baseline growth in energy demand, climate targets, and mitigation technologies and costs. Of these, baseline uncertainties are the most important 4, 43 . As mitigation analysis is by de nition relative to a baseline or reference scenario, assumptions embedded in that baseline are inevitably in uential. Yet baselines are rarely consistent in their treatment of energy-supply and end-use technologies. Although the trend of improving end-use e ciency is invariably extended into the future, the trend of decreasing carbon intensity is not (for example, Fig. 3 in ref. 44 ). e apparent contribution of end-use technologies to reported mitigation potentials is therefore reduced, as the baseline already includes substantial e ciency gains (for example, Fig. 5 in ref. 45 ). e exclusion of end-use e ciency from mitigation analyses due to its inclusion in baseline assumptions is not just a characteristic of modelling studies. For similar reasons, the in uential work on climate 'stabilization wedges' only included a limited subset of end-use technologies (relating to cars and buildings) despite recognizing that e ciency improvements o ered the greatest potential source of emission reductions 46 .
To compare potential contributions to mitigation of energy-supply and end-use technologies on a like-for-like basis, the baseline needs to hold end-use e ciency constant at current levels 4, 47 . One large-scale modelling study that made this adjustment found e cient end-use technologies accounted for 58-75% of cumulative emission reductions to 2100, with an average of around 60% (ref. 4) . ese provide the outcome indicators (O4.1-4.3) shown in Table 3 .
Even studies that do not correct for the over-estimation of energy-supply contributions still nd e cient end-use technologies constitute an important, if not the dominant, mitigation option 44 . A review of mitigation scenarios to 2050 in six countries found end-use e ciency contributed 42-89% of emission reductions with a mean of 63% (see Table 3 .8 in ref. 48 ). Moreover, the relative importance of end-use technologies increased both in nearer-term scenarios and under less stringent stabilization targets 43, 49 .
Input-output asymmetries in the innovation system
Taken together, the indicators summarized in Tables 2 and 3 characterize the di erent stages, processes and drivers of innovation in the energy system. Figure 3 compares representative indicators of innovation inputs (Fig. 3a) with outputs and outcomes (Fig. 3b) .
Directed innovation e orts clearly privilege energy-supply technologies (indicators I1-6). Yet end-use technologies dominate innovation system outputs (indicators O1-3) and the required outcomes for climate change mitigation (indicators O4).
End-use technologies dominate system outputs for various reasons. End-use e ciency is economically attractive as it reduces lifecycle costs and so improves productivity 50, 51 . It also o ers 'co-bene ts' ranging from reduced import dependence and reduced price volatility to reduced air pollution and better-quality energy services 52 . ese generic advantages of end-use e ciency are complemented by technology-speci c potentials. In the context of learning, each technological unit invested in and adopted can be seen as an experiment: the more experiments that take place, the higher the potential for learning (all else held constant). is favours dispersed, small-scale end-use technologies as a source of potential cost reduction to drive widespread di usion. End-use technologies are also the nal link in an energy-conversion chain whose purpose is to provide useful services to end-users. Many end-use technologies are produced, marketed and sold in consumer goods markets characterized by non-directed private activity (in comparison to the regulated energy-supply sector). e relative advantage of end-use innovations has proved central to changes in the energy system observed over time 32 . In summary, e cient end-use technologies occupy a greater share of energy system investments and capacity, engage higher levels of private-sector activity, o er higher potential cost reductions, return larger social bene ts and promise greater future mitigation of climate change.
Why Are Energy End-Use Technologies Marginalized?
In this section, we o er our perspective on the reasons for the privileging within directed innovation e orts of energy-supply technologies over e cient end-use technologies. We emphasize from the outset that this is our interpretation of the data rather than a nding substantiated by the data. Our perspective is also necessarily general and does not distinguish the institutional and political di erences between innovation systems at di erent scales for di erent technologies 29 . ese caveats notwithstanding, we consider four possible arguments to explain why end-use technologies may be marginalized in directed innovation e orts: analytical intractability; invisibility and dispersion; weak political economic in uence; and bounded innovation heuristics.
First, end-use technologies are smaller in scale, orders of magnitude larger in number, more dispersed, and highly heterogeneous compared with the pits, pipelines and power plants of the energy supply. Data are correspondingly patchy or unavailable (see p437 in ref. 53 ). Many end-use technologies are also consumer goods with a variety of attributes over which end-user preferences vary. E ciency may be traded-o against style, speed and safety 54 . With engineering as the dominant disciplinary approach to energy research 55 , these 'behavioural' characteristics of end-use technology adoption pose greater problems for modellers and analysts. Most widely used integrated assessment models do not resolve end-use technologies. Energy assessments can exclude them all together 56 . Second, the scale and visibility of statuesque wind turbines or monumental engineering constructions engender achievement and capture attention 57 . China's vast new coal-to-liquids facility is a recent case in point 58 . Renewables, nuclear and carbon capture hog the headlines of a low-carbon future. e Greenpeace-funded scenario that sparked controversy in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation depicted 77% of global energy needs in 2050 being supplied by renewables 59, 60 . Yet among the 160+ scenarios reviewed, it was an outlier not for its assumptions about renewable technology deployment but for its assumptions about end-use e ciency and energy demand 61, 62 . is went unnoticed. e end use of energy is largely invisible, and incremental e ciency improvements dispersed over many hundreds of enduse innovations are somehow "less tangible" 46 . ird, the fossil-fuel-dominated energy supply has been described as a 'techno-institutional complex' that has become locked in 63 . As interrelated technological and social systems evolve, they develop increasing institutional rigidity and resistance to change 64 . Established infrastructures and rules create barriers to entry. Vested interests exert political and market pressure to preserve the dominant position of incumbent technologies. Energy-supply companies are among the largest, most capitalized corporate interests in the world. In contrast, end-use technologies lack coherent in uence in the political economy. ere are no simple metrics to substantiate this contention, but it is indicative that fossil-fuel industry revenues are on the order of $5 trillion annually, whereas the largest energy end-use technology industry -automobiles -has revenues of $1.5 trillion (ref. 65 ). Fourth, directed innovation e orts in the energy system until now have cumulatively reinforced the dominant in uence of the energy-supply industry over its end-use counterparts. Since the late-nineteenth century, for every $1 in US federal subsidies to e cient end-use technologies, $35 have gone to energy-supply technologies 66 . Since 1974, more public resources in developed countries have been invested into RD&D of nuclear fusion than on all e cient end-use technologies combined 47, 67 . e search for solutions in evolving innovation systems becomes limited by prevailing practices, ways of thinking, and expectations, conceptualized as a 'technological trajectory' 68 . For energy innovation, this trajectory points rmly towards the energy supply. Proponents of a R&D-led mitigation strategy conclude "there should be no need to pick 'winners' or to get locked into inferior technologies" 69 before citing six 'neutral' technology options worthy of R&D support; ve of the six relate to the energy supply. Silver bullets of radical innovation for single-handedly tackling climate change are similarly sought only in low cost, limitless, zero carbon supply or geo-engineering technologies 7 . Analogous silver 'buckshot' strategies distributing solutions across many heterogenous end-use technologies are considered less applicable, with greater perceived di culties in scaling a breakthrough to make a large contribution to emissions reduction via private sector investment.
The Importance of Assessing Innovation Systems
Our analysis reveals a pronounced and pervasive asymmetry in the innovation system for energy technologies seen through the lens of climate change mitigation. Whereas the outputs of innovation emphasize the importance of e cient end-use technologies, inputs privilege energy-supply technologies. Directed innovation e orts are misaligned with their required outcomes. Our conclusion is that signi cantly greater e ort is needed to develop the full potential of e cient end-use technologies.
e allocation of public resources to innovation is ultimately political 70 . A diversi ed portfolio of mitigation options preserves option value and insures against the risk of particular innovation failures 71 . But concentrating scarce resources in a more narrowly focused investment strategy can harness the bene ts of scale through a virtuous cycle of learning, cost reduction, standardization, network expansion, further scaling, and so on 72 . e merits of diversi cation and concentration in portfolio design should be argued openly for energy-supply and end-use technologies with clear criteria.
Our analytical framework provides such criteria and ensures e orts are matched to requirements, or directed inputs to resulting outputs and outcomes. e Department of Energy's Quadrennial Technology Review of energy innovation in the US used a similarly comprehensive and transparent approach 1 . It concluded that the US federal portfolio needed "rebalancing" in large part towards , the indicators describe the proportion of all benefits generated by that category of technology divided by the proportion of all costs incurred by that category of technology so that proportional benefits are normalised to proportional costs. Gbl = Global. Gbl* = Global with English-speaking language bias 77 .Benefit:cost ratio (B:C ratio). .
end-use e ciency. We draw the same conclusion about the relative underinvestment throughout the innovation system in end-use technologies, in the US, the EU, and elsewhere. Although we have focused on the supply-end-use dichotomy, there are other potential tensions within directed innovation e orts. ese include: radical versus incremental innovation 7, 46 , centralized versus distributed generation 73 , near-term versus long-term outcomes 71 and technology-push versus market-pull drivers 23 . Climate change mitigation is also not the only objective for technological change in the energy system. Energy security and universal access to modern, clean energy are other important global scale issues 52 . Inevitably, trade-o s have to be made, but the analytical framework we have set out supports comprehensive, consistent and aligned innovation e orts 11 . A failure to tackle innovation systemically can lead to unintended or even adverse outcomes. e magnitude of the innovation challenge for climate change mitigation also means narrowly focused or partial responses are wholly inadequate. E cient end-use technologies should take their rightful place at the centre of directed innovation e orts and public resource allocations.
Methods
We compiled a set of indicators describing all the key elements of our analytical framework for the innovation system (see Fig. 1 ). Using indicators to characterize innovation systems is well established, for example, to distinguish innovation inputs from outputs 3, 74 or to map changes over time in key innovation system functions 75, 76 . For each indicator, we contrast the proportion of e ort directed at energy-supply and energy end-use technologies, in each case distinguishing innovation system inputs from outputs (following ref. 74 ). To minimize categorization bias, we include a third 'other' category for technologies that link supply with end-use. 'Other' technologies include grid and network infrastructure, electricity storage and distributed forms of electricity and heat generation. (All data and explanations for the indicators are provided in the Supplementary Information).
Our selection of the categories of indicator and the indicators themselves was designed to cover: all the elements of the innovation system represented in our analytical framework; the principal types of indicator referenced in the literature on energy innovation; and di erent spatial scales, from national to global.
For each category of indicator, we provide a subjective assessment of the extent to which we sample from the full 'indicator space' , that is, the set of all possible indicators for the corresponding element of the innovation system. Our assessment distinguishes high, medium, low coverage and also unknown if insu cient data exist to assess coverage. We assess spatial coverage as well as sample coverage.
As examples, we assess our 'public RD&D investments' category of indicator to have high spatial coverage as indicators are global, regional, national and include new data on the major developing economies (see Table 2 ). We also assess this category of indicator to have high sample coverage as the indicators describe all public RD&D activities with no major omissions (but subject to data availability, see below).
In contrast, we assess our 'analysis & modelling' category of indicator to have medium spatial coverage as indicators are principally global with only selected national data (see Table 2 ). We also assess this category of indicator to have low sample coverage as ndings from less cited studies are omitted, particularly those outside the peer-reviewed literature.
We similarly provide a subjective assessment of both spatial coverage and sample coverage for all of the indicators within each category. e indicators, as well as these subjective assessments of coverage, are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 , with full details provided in the Supplementary Information Our selection of indicators was heavily constrained by data availability, particularly for developing countries. As a result, some categories of indicator are biased towards developed countries, particular the US and the EU. ese biases are re ected in our assessments of spatial coverage. Global scale indicators describe both developed and developing countries, although energy-related innovation data for smaller developing countries are incomplete so may introduce an under-reporting error.
Collectively, our indicators provide a comprehensive and representative account of directed innovation e orts. However, we do not assume our indicators are directly commensurable, so we do not provide an aggregated descriptor. Rather, we present each of the indicators in their original units as their purpose is to describe succinctly particular elements of the innovation system. Insu cient understanding of the inter-dependencies between Table 2 . b, Outputs and outcomes of the innovation system, for details see Table 3 . Bars show two representatives for each category of indicator. Labels link indicators to elements of the analytical framework shown in Fig. 1 and summarized in Table 1 . 'Other' technologies are not shown.
these elements and their relative importance, compounded by data limitations, prevents a quantitative rendering of the innovation system as a whole.
